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Orbe v. Commonwealth
519 S.E.2d 808 (Va. 1999)
L Facts
Dennis Mitchell Orbe ("Orbe") robbed a convenience store in York
County on January 24, 1998, at approximately 3:38 a.m. One of the store's
security cameras recorded Orbe approach the check-out counter and point
a revolver at the clerk's chest. The clerk, Richard Sterling Burnett ("Burnett"), opened the cash register drawer and Orbe shot him once in the chest.
As Burnett clutched his chest and struggled to remain standing, Orbe
walked around the counter, pulled some money from the open cash register
drawer, and left. A customer discovered Burnett's body a short time later
and called the police. An investigator with the York County sheriff's office
collected evidence including the video tape from the security camera, from
which he printed images of Orbe. Several people contacted the sheriff's
office and identified the perpetrator as Orbe; a warrant was soon obtained
for his arrest. However, Orbe was not captured until a week later, after a
high-speed chase in Richmond. Police seized a partially loaded .357 magnum revolver from Orbe; the Division of Forensic Science tested this gun
and determined it was the weapon that fired the bullet that killed Burnett.'
A jury found Orbe guilty of capital murder, use or display of a firearm
while committing murder, robbery, and use or display of a firearm while
committing robbery, and recommended a sentence of death. The Commonwealth persuaded the jury of Orbe's future dangerousness with evidence of
his prior criminal conduct, some of which was unadjudicated at the time of
the sentencing. The Commonwealth pointed to three separate incidents:
an attempted abduction on January 21, 1998, and the shooting of a person
who attempted to stop the abduction; the armed robbery of two elderly
men of their wallets and car, also on January 21; and the threatening and
robbery of three women whom he left locked in a closet for over four hours
on January 30, the day before he was captured by police for Burnett's
murder. Orbe subsequently pleaded guilty to most of these offenses. Lay
mitigation witnesses testified to Orbe's troubled childhood, abuse of alcohol, a change in his behavior shortly before the criminal incidents on
January 21, 1998, and his good behavior in jail. A clinical psychologist, Dr.
Thomas A. Pasquale, testified that Orbe had exhibited suicidal tendencies,
1. Orbe v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 808, 809-11 (Va. 1999).
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was depressed over his perceived failure as a father, drank heavily, and had
an impulse control dysfunction. Dr. Pasquale suggested that Orbe's actions
were motivated by a desire to visit his father whom he had recently relocated after being abandoned by him at an early age. Regarding Orbe's
future dangerousness, Dr. Pasquale testified that Orbe would not be a threat
in prison if he avoided alcohol and abuse at the hands of other prisoners, but
would be very dangerous if he escaped. The trial judge followed the recommendation of the jury and sentenced Orbe to death. The Supreme Court
of Virginia consolidated Orbe's appeal to the Virginia Court of Appeals of
his noncapital convictions with the automatic appeal of his capital conviction.'
IL. Holding
The Supreme Court of Virginia considered and denied the following
claims raised by Orbe on direct appeal: (1) the trial court wrongly refused
to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses; (2) unadjudicated criminal
acts should not be used to show future dangerousness; (3) certain photographs should not have been introduced into evidence because they proved
certain facts to which Orbe had already stipulated; and (4) the trial court
improperly refused to allow Orbe to mail questionnaires to prospective
jurors.' The court refused to consider several claims that Orbe defaulted.
First, Orbe defaulted his claim of denial of individual voir dire because he
only raised the claim in his brief and did not include it in an assignment of
error as required by Rule 5:17(c) of the Virginia Supreme Court Rules.4
Additionally, the court refused to consider seven of Orbe's seventeen
assignments of error because he did not argue them on brief as required
under Quesinberry v. Commonwealth. s Finally, the court held that Orbe
failed to preserve an objection to the verdict form, and therefore could not
raise the issue on appeal.6 Orbe had intended to claim, using Atkins v.
Commonwealtb, that the verdict form given to the jury was inconsistent
with the penalty phase jury instructions

2. Id. at 809-12.
3. Id. at 810.
4. Id. at 815. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:17(c).
5. Orbe, 519 S.E.2d at 812 n.8 (citing Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 218,
222 (Va. 1991)).
6.
Orbe, 519 S.E.2d, at 816 n.13. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:17(c).
7.
510 S.E.2d 445 (Va. 1999).
8. Orbe, 519 S.E.2d at 816 n.13. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 457
(Va. 1999) (setting aside death sentence where jury form was "incomplete ... and did not
comport with a correct statement of the law").

1999]

ORBE V. COMMONWEALTH

IX. Analysis and Application in Virginia
A. Instructionson Lesser Included Offenses
Orbe requested the trial judge to instruct the jury on first degree
murder, and on the grading of homicides, because it was not clear that he
acted with malice. 9 The court concluded that the evidence of the murder in
the commission of the robbery was clear enough to warrant exclusion of
instructions on lesser included offenses: "It is well-established in Virginia
that jury instructions are proper only if supported by the evidence, and that
more than a scintilla of evidence is necessary to support a lesser-included
offense instruction requested by the defendant."'0 The court held that
because the video tape so clearly showed the murder was committed in the
course of a robbery and because Orbe failed to offer any evidence that he
did not act with malice or premeditation, there was no reason to give an
instruction on lesser included offenses."
The court's own language belies its holding. It stated that "an instruction of first degree murder was not warranted because the video tape clearly
established that Burnett was shot in the chest during the commission of
*armed robbery at the convenience store."12 Compare this assertion to the
first degree murder provision embodied in section 18.2-32 of the Virginia
Code: "Murder, other than capital murder.., in the commission of...
robbery... is murder of the first degree." 3 The difference between capital
murder and first degree is that first degree lacks premeditation, willfulness,
and deliberation. 4 This determination of the premeditation requirements
for capital murder must be made by jurors and their opportunity to consider
it should not be precluded by the judge's choice of instructions. The Su9. Id. at 812-813.
10. Id. at 813. (quoting Commonwealth v. Donkor, 507 S.E.2d 75, 76 (Va. 1998))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
11.
Orbe offered two instructions. The first included elements of both first and second
degree murder, as well as voluntary manslaughter. Apparently, the defense contended that
the shooting was accidental based on the firing mechanism of the gun, a double-action
revolver, and this instruction would have provided the jurors with options if they agreed
with this theory. The second instruction asserted that if there was a reasonable doubt as to
the grade of the homicide, the grade should be determined in Orbe's favor. Id. at 812 & 813
n.9.
12.
Id. at 813.
13.
VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-32 (Michie 1995).
14. See Briley v. Bass, 584 F. Supp. 807, 839 (E.D. Va. 1984) ("[C]apital murder is an
appropriate finding only while both an ongoing robbery with a deadly weapon and a
premeditated murder are present simultaneously, only where the defendant while engaged
in the robbery with the use of a deadly weapon has killed willfully, with premeditation, and
with deliberation.").
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preme Court of Virginia's holding at best obfuscates the distinction between
capital and first degree murder, and at worst, simply wipes from the Code
the offense of first degree murder in the commission of a robbery.
Furthermore, the court determined that Orbe failed to offer a "scintilla
of evidence that [he] acted without premeditation or malice so as to justify
an instruction on second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter."" To
the contrary, the court noticed that Orbe offered evidence based on the
firing mechanism of the gun that the shooting may have been accidental:
"[D]efendant posited that the testimony elicited from Scott Glass, the
forensic expert, during cross-examination supported the defendant's contention that the shooting of Burnett was 'accidental.' 16 Though this evidence
may not have been extremely persuasive, it is more than a scintilla. Properly instructed, the jury could easily have found first degree murder rather
than capital murder.
B. FutureDangerousnessBased on UnadjudicatedCriminalActs
Orbe challenged the finding of future dangerousness with three arguments. First, he pointed to his lack of a prior history of violent offenses,
but the court found that the three criminal episodes in the two weeks
surrounding the murder were sufficient to show future dangerousness. 7
Second, Orbe claimed that the trial court used the wrong standard-sufficient
"probable cause" rather than "probability" that he would be "guilty of
future dangerousness"-in overruling the defense's motion to strike the
Commonwealth's evidence at sentencing."S The court responded that the
trial judge corrected himself after stating "probable cause" and gave the
proper standard, "probability," under section 19.2-264.4(C) of the Virginia
Code. 9 The court also pointed out that the jury instructions were correct
as to the standard.2" Finally, Orbe challenged the use of unadjudicated
criminal acts to show future dangerousness.2' The court held that most of
the claimed unadjudicated acts were actually adjudicated because Orbe
pleaded guilty to them before the sentencing phase, and that the ones to.
which he had not pleaded were admissible under Virginia precedent.22
The precedent in Virginia for allowing unadjudicated criminal acts to
be considered in sentencing of capital defendants is well established. The
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Orbe, 519 S.E.2d at 813.
Id.at 813 n.10.
Id. at 813-14.
Id.
Id. at 813-14. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1995).
Orbe, 519 S.E.2d at 814.
Id. at 813-14.
Id. at 814 (quoting Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785 (Va. 1990)).
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court in Orbe stated the standard thus: "[E]vidence of each unadjudicated
criminal act admitted to show a defendant's future dangerousness is not
subject to the reasonable doubt standard. Rather, the finding of future
dangerousness must be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt."23
It is unclear how incidents about which there may be reasonable doubt can,
in the cumulative, prove future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even more difficult for defense counsel is that once future dangerousness is
found by a jury, that decision is essentially final. The Virginia Supreme
Court has never overturned such a finding. Although in Orbe's case enough
of his criminal acts were adjudicated that strenuously contesting the
unadjudicated acts might not have been successful, it is critical for defense
counsel to be prepared to attack the Commonwealth's evidence whenever
unadjudicated criminal acts comprise any part of the future dangerousness
showing. Built in to the reasonable doubt standard for future dangerousness
is the presumed safeguard that defense counsel has an opportunity to cast
doubt on each of the parts of the future dangerousness showing, thereby
casting doubt on the whole showing. Thus defense counsel must take full
advantage of this opportunity by searching for (via motions for discovery
or through outside investigation) facts that may discredit the witnesses for
the Commonwealth, engaging in extensive cross-examination, and
presenting contrary witnesses. Also, despite the unfavorable holdings of the
Supreme Court of Virginia, defense counsel should continue to object to the
introduction of unadjudicated conduct in anticipation of a federal
constitutional limitation on the use of such evidence.24
C. Admission ofPhotographicEvidence
Orbe argued that since he had already stipulated to the facts that
photographs of the victim would show, they should not have been
introduced because they served only to arouse the jury's sympathy for the
victim rather than help determine Orbe's guilt.2" The photographic
evidence included pictures of the crime scene (including the open register
drawer and Burnett's body on the floor), the gunshot wound and the body's
condition at the autopsy, as well as personal photographs (one of the victim
with some friends and another of him at church).26 The court held that the
23. Id. at 814 (citing Walker v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 565, 572 (Va. 1999)).
24. Such was the fortunate case in Simmons v. South Carolina,512 U.S. 154 (1994)
(holding that where future dangerousness is at issue, jury must be instructed that "life in
prison" means "life without parole"). Those defendants whose counsel had proffered a
Simmons instruction in the face of contrary precedent, and whose cases were still in direct
appeals, obtained the advantage of Simmons.
25.
Orbe, 519 S.E.2d at 814-15.
26. Id. at 815.
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trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs because
they accurately depicted the crime scene and were more probative than
prejudicial.27 It also stated that precedent clearly established that stipulation
to certain facts would not preempt the use of photographs."
In its analysis, the court neglected to consider fully the proper uses of
the photographs. Nowhere did the court indicate whether the photographs
were introduced at the guilt or penalty phase of the trial; rather, it simply
lumped them together and found that they were admissible to show
"motive, intent, method, malice, premeditation and the atrociousness of [the
defendant's] crimes."29 The first five elements of this list are relevant to the
guilt phase, while the last, atrociousness, apparently refers to vileness and
depravity of mind and is applicable only to the sentencing phase. Further,
the court did not discuss how (or even cite a case supporting the proposition
that) the two photographs of the victim before the crime depicted the crime
scene, showed the motive and intent of the defendant, or addressed the
factual question of whether Orbe killed Burnett. These two photographs
more properly should have been considered victim impact evidence, which
also is relevant only for purposes of sentencing under Payne v. Tennessee."
D.JurorQuestionnairesand Individual Voir Dire
The court held that the manner in which the voir dire is conducted is
within the discretion of the trial court and that the trial court could refuse
to allow Orbe to mail questionnaires to prospective jurors. The decision not
to allow the mailing of the questionnaires was justified, the court reasoned,
because they might have impeded the trial judge's opportunity to evaluate
each member of the venire.31

27.

Id.

28. Id. (citing Mackall v. Commonwealth, 372 S.E.2d 759 (Va. 1988)).
29. Id. (quoting Chichester v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 638, 648 (Va. 1994))
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. 501 U.S. 808 (1991). The right of victims to present to the courts the effects of the
crime on them is codified in section 19.2-11.01 of the Virginia Code. VA. CODE. § 19.2-11.01
(Michie 1999). The photographs of the victim were probably gathered from the family in
accordance with this provision, but should not have been introduced to the jury at the guilt
phase. The procedures for gathering this evidence are outlined in sections 19.264.4 and
19.264.5 of the Virginia Code. See VA. CODE. S S 19.2-264.4, 19.2-264.5 (Michie 1999). A
similar statement of the right of victims to inform the court of the impact of the crime was
ratified and added to the Virginia Constitution in 1996. VA. CONST. art. I, S 8-A. For a
recent discussion of the admissibility of victim impact evidence, under both statutory and
case law, see Beck v. Commonwealth, 484 S.E.2d 898 (Va. 1997).
31.
Orbe, 519 S.E.2d at 815-16 (citing Whitley v. Commonwealth, 286 S.E.2d 162 (Va.
1982)).
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E. ProportionalityReview
Mandatedby Section 17 1-313(C)of the Virginia Code
The court claimed to have compiled and reviewed the records of not
only all death sentence cases it had considered, but also all capital cases "in
which the trial court or jury imposed a life sentence and defendant
petitioned this court for appeal."32 It specifically focused on and discussed
cases where an employee was killed during a robbery and future
dangerousness was the predicate and found that there were enough of these
cases to support Orbe's sentence." However, the court reminds us that the
purpose of its review "is to reach a reasoned judgment regarding what cases
justify the imposition of the death penalty" and that it "cannot insure
complete symmetry among all death penalty cases."34 The Orbe court
admitted that it reviews only those cases that were "reviewed by this court,"
which excludes a large number of life-sentenced capital cases. While Orbe
may be in line with other cases in which death was imposed, the court has
no way of knowing whether the sentence was disproportionate when
compared to similar cases in which a life rather than death sentence was
imposed since the pool of those cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of
Virginia is very small. The court sees few life capital cases because those
defendants who receive a life sentence on a capital charge appeal to the
Virginia Court of Appeals, and few of these will appeal to or be granted
review by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Moreover, section 17.1-313 (C)(2)
requires that the supreme court consider "both the crime and the
defendant."35 None of the review in Orbe considers the specific defendant,
Orbe, in relation to other death- or life-sentenced defendants. In other
words, we can only be assured that Orbe's sentence is no more
disproportionate than that imposed on any other death-sentenced defendant.

Robert H. Robinson, Jr.

32. Id. at 816. It is unknown which cases these were since the court failed to cite or
discuss any cases where the defendant appealed a life sentence after a capital conviction.
33. Id. at 816-17.
34. Id. at 817.
35. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(C)(2) (Michie 1999).

